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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops a mathematical model to explore epidemic spread through
the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The
model will simulate an epidemic caused by a biological attack using an agent that has
the ability to spread through person-to-person contact (small pox, hemorrhagic fever,
etc.) A stochastic modeling process will be used along with widely accepted math-
ematical formulas for an SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed) epidemic
model. A heterogeneous population composed of numerous homogenous subgroups
with varying interaction rates simulates the unique structure of military combat units.
The model will be evaluated to determine which units facilitate the most rapid spread
of the epidemic. The model will then test a number of different scenarios to determine
the effects of varying quarantine techniques, vaccination strategies and protective pos-
tures on the spread of the disease.
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DISCLAIMER
The computer program in the Appendix is supplied on an “as is” basis, with
no warrantees of any kind. The author bears no responsibility for any consequences
of using this program.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is better to have an approximate answer to the right question than
a right answer to the wrong question. John Tukey [Ref. 1: pp. 4-5]
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This thesis will describe and model the spread of a man-made epidemic within
a closed population that contains arbitrarily many subgroups. The primary pop-
ulation to be modeled is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capa-
ble)(MEU(SOC)). Military combat units have a population and mixing structure that
is very different from the general population. The spread of an epidemic intentionally
introduced into a military population will differ greatly from the naturally occuring
epidemics in the general public. This thesis will use a susceptible, exposed, infectious,
removed (SEIR) epidemic model to estimate the overall progression of an epidemic in-
troduced into a military combat unit, specifically the ground combat element (GCE)
of the MEU(SOC).
A series of factors determine the effects of a biological weapon delivered upon
any population. Factors that determine the effect of a biological weapon include,
but are not limited to, the type and amount of agent, dissemination methods, at-
mospheric conditions that effect virulence and infectivity, dilution in the atmosphere
and the protective posture of the exposed population. [Ref. 2: pp. 30-32] The Soviet
Union spent many years studying the effect these factors have on the success of their
weapons. They developed a measure called the specific expenditure value, or Q50.
Q50 is the amount of the agent that needs to be delivered, to infect no less than
fifty percent of the target population, that is evenly distributed over 1 km2. This
measure took into account all of the above factors and was obviously situationally
dependent.[Ref. 3: p. 21]
The purpose of this research is not to incorporate all of the variables in-
volved with developing a biological weapons effect model. The necessary knowledge
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of physics, molecular biology, meteorology and many other disciplines is beyond the
scope of this thesis. This research is specifically interested in developing a model
to estimate the effect of a biological weapon that possesses the ability to produce
secondary infections through the transmission of a communicable disease. The model
will then begin from the point after an effective Q50 event has occured. We are inter-
ested in the spread of the epidemic throughout the entire population after one small
subset has been infected at the fifty percent level.
After the model is formulated numerous test cases will be run to develop a
baseline database that will contain runs where the epidemic is allowed to spread
unhindered. This data will be used to validate that the model is actually working as
expected. The model will allow the user to insert specific defensive techniques and
advance the epidemic at any rate they choose. The effect of these defensive techniques
will then be compared to the initial data to determine if there is any reduction in
the overall spread of the epidemic. As epidemiology is a study of many variables the
output of the model is not expected to produce mathematically exact answers. The
purpose is to show that such a tool may be useful to operating forces in planning
their response to biological weapons.
B. BACKGROUND
1. The Study of Epidemics
The study of epidemics is as old as the study of medicine. Hippocrates, in the
fifth century B.C., suggested that there were many things that may cause disease in
humans and by keeping track of the circumstances surrounding each case of disease,
a doctor may be able to infer some causal effects. Keeping track of rates of disease
in the different seasons, different communities, among different ages and sexes and
different lifestyles may give clues to what is causing a certain disease.
It was John Grant, in 1662, who did the first quantitative study of disease
patterns in a population. Through weekly study of birth and death reports in London
2
he found that males had both a higher birth and mortality rate. He was also able to
track the seasonal change in mortality rates that Hippocrates had mentioned more
the 2000 years prior. [Ref. 4: pp. 4-6]
Some of the earliest work in a developing deterministic system to address the
spread of an epidemic came from W.O. Kermack and A.G. McKendrick. They saw
every population (of fixed size = N)at any time divided into three stages or cohorts
with respect to the epidemic:[Ref. 5: pp 312-313]
S(t) = susceptible
I(t) = infected and circulating throughout the population
R(t) = removed by recovery, quarantine or death
S(t) + I(t) + R(t) = N = constant (I.1)
At t = 0,
S(0) + I(0) = N (I.2)
2. The Use of Disease as a Weapon
Biological weapons do not have an extensive history of use in the world of
military tactics. While the effects can be devastating, biological agents still require
time to incubate, spread and reach an incapacitating state. Attacking the enemy
with plague in the middle of a fierce conflict will do little in the immediate future
to affect the outcome of the battle. One of the first recorded uses of disease as an
offensive weapon came from the fourteenth century when the Tafta army, in present
day Crimea, catapulted the bodies of plague victims over the walls of Kaffa during a
siege. The Japanese attempted to use plague against the Chinese before and during
World War II. They released billions of plague infected fleas over their target areas in
an attempt to conceal the attack as a natural occurrence of plague. The effectiveness
of the attack was never quantified as the official Japanese position is that they never
used such a weapon. [Ref. 3: p. 166] In 1984 the Rajneesh religious sect in the United
States used the food borne parasite Salmonella in an attack. Their attack was an
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effort to disrupt the upcoming local elections. Using food service areas in restaurants,
offices and public venues they managed to infect over 700 people. Reportedly there
were no fatalities. [Ref. 6] A covert attack on the staging and port facilities used
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm could have had a significantly
different outcome. In the world of instant news, reports of a plague or small pox
outbreak would have significantly hindered the public relations fight and crippled the
logistical build up of troops.
Most recently, weapons grade anthrax has been mailed to several liberal politi-
cians and media personalities. To date a total of 18 people have been infected with
either pulmonary or cutaneous forms of anthrax. Five cases became fatal. Shortly
after the second confirmed case of anthrax surfaced, it became apparent that there
had been a deliberate release of anthrax. Many medical professionals began hypoth-
esizing about the repercussions of the release of a communicable disease rather than
the non-communicable anthrax.
[I]f obtained and intentionally released, smallpox could cause a public
health catastrophe because of its communicability. Even a single case could
lead to 10 to 20 others. It is estimated that no more than 20% of the popu-
lation has any immunity from the prior vaccination. There is no acceptable
treatment, and the communicability by aerosol requires negative-pressure iso-
lation. Therefore, these limited isolation resources in medical facilities would
be easily overwhelmed.[Ref. 7: pp. 1-7]
Since the events surrounding the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, bi-
ological weapons have once again been thrust to the center of national attention.
The threat is not just from terrorism. As the United States military takes action
in Afghanistan, evidence has been discovered that al Queda and the Taliban are re-
searching the development of chemical and biological weapons. Our service men and
women are again on the front lines with the threat of biological weapons looming over
them.
Of the three types of weapons of mass destruction; Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical; the Biological Weapons family is the easiest to produce. The industrial
4
infrastructure, scientific know-how and available technology are readily available to
any country with a moderately sophisticated pharmaceutical industry. The tools and
techniques for developing a biological agent are identical to those used in developing
many of the vaccines widely used all over the world today. Manufacturing the agent
and turning it into a military weapon is another process all together. Many agents
are fragile and susceptible to environmental stresses such as heat, cold, humidity,
ultra-violet light and many others. There are processes and techniques to enhance
the survivability of biological agents. The former Soviet Union developed ways to
keep even the most fragile organisms alive during the delivery process.
Biological weapons can most assuredly be placed on strategic missiles, cruise
missiles and combat aircraft. These assets are not, however, necessary for the deploy-
ment of such weapons. Crop dusters, car bombs, delivery trucks and even suitcase
bombs can be used to deliver significant amounts of a biological agent. [Ref. 8: pp.
39-40]
3. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
(Biological Weapons Convention(BWC)) signed in 1972, prohibited the development
of biological agents for use in offensive weapons. The Soviet Union, a signer of the
treaty, almost immediately stood up Biopreparat(one of four agencies inside the Soviet
Union that produced biological weapons). Biopreparat was responsible for develop-
ing, testing and weaponizing various agents for use as biological weapons against the
United States. In his book Biohazard, Dr Ken Alibek, former Deputy Director of
Biopreparat and defector from the Soviet Union, spells out the build up of the Soviet
biological weapons program.
Over a twenty-year period that began, ironically, with Moscow’s en-
dorsement of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the Soviet Union
built the largest and most advanced biological warfare establishment in the
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world. We were among the 140 signatories of the convention, pledging ”not to
develop, produce, stockpile of otherwise acquire or retain” biological agents for
offensive military purposes. At the same time, through our covert program,
we stockpiled hundreds of tons of anthrax and dozens of tons of plague and
smallpox near Moscow and other Russian cities for use against the United
States and its Western allies. [Ref. 3: p. x]
The Soviet Union, as late as 1992, was also developing and weaponizing ge-
netically engineered smallpox plague, Marburg, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis
(VEE). The specific expenditure values (Q50) for these weapons is very small.







Since its inception, the Soviet biological weapons program searched for unique
agents that would be difficult to identify and more difficult to treat.
The Soviet government decided that the best agents were those for
which there was no known cure. This shaped the entire course of our program
and thrust us into a never-ending race against the medical profession. Every
time a new treatment or vaccine came to light somewhere, we were back in
our labs, trying to figure out how to overcome its effects.[Ref. 3: p. 18]
In 1989 the Soviet Union had completed work on a new type of agent. They had found
a way to genetically engineer the pneumonic strain of plague to include a myelin toxin
in the bacteria’s DNA that attacked the central nervous system. The toxin attacks
the coating of nerve receptors, the myelin sheath, causing paralysis. In one agent,
the Soviet Union now had the ability to release the world’s oldest biological weapon
with a decidedly new and dangerous twist.
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Although the toxin-plague was never developed into a weapon the technology
of combining bacteria with naturally occuring toxins set the stage for an entire new
class of weapons, the genetically engineered biological weapon. [Ref. 3: p. 167]
4. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Opera-
tions Capable)
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC))
is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary organization (see Figure 1).
Their mission is to be a forward presence able to respond within days to crises in
their area of operation. There are always at least three MEUs(SOC)deployed at any
given time. One in the Mediterranean, one in the western Pacific and one in the
Indian Ocean or Arabian Gulf region. Each MEU consists of a standing command
element(CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE)
and a combat service support element(CSSE). This model is going to be concerned
specifically with the GCE.
The GCE is comprised of a reinforced infantry battalion or battalion landing
team. Standard reinforcements include an artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, armor,
assault amphibian units, and other detachments as required. The MEU CE retains
some flexibility in deciding the number and type of attachments the GCE will require.
[Ref. 10: p. 2.4]
This model is based on Battalion Landing Team 1/8 which deployed to the
Mediterranean from Nov 1996 through May 1997.
C. ORGANIZATION
This thesis contains five chapters, including this introduction. Chapter II de-
scribes the mathematics of epidemiology and introduces accepted formulae for both
deterministic and stochastic epidemic modeling. Chapter III explains the layout of
the SEIR model used for this research. User defined parameters, the Microsoft Excel



























































                         Legend
MACG = Marine Air Control Group
MALS  = Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron
MASS  = Marine Air Support Squadron
LAAD   = Low-Altitude Air Defense
MWSS = Marine Wing Support Squadron
HMM = Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
VMA  = Marine Attack Squadron
HMH = Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron
HML/A= Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Sqdn
TOW = Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, 
Wire Guided Missile
LAR = Light Armored Reconnaissance
Det. = Detachment




Figure 1. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
all explained here. Chapter IV introduces the scenario that was tested, produces
the results of the unhindered epidemic spread trials, explains different defensive tech-
niques and their effect on the overall spread of the epidemic. Chapter V presents a
summary of the research and recommendations for areas of further research.
8
II. THE MATHEMATICS OF EPIDEMICS
The first idea that must occur to anyone who hears me is the place which
among all such subjects we shall gratefully assign to mathematical science.
George Buchanan at the Epidemiological Society of London, 1881 [Ref. 1: pp.
4-5]
Basic epidemic models allow for variations in the different stages of the in-
fection. Identifying the stages to include depends on the dynamics of the disease,
the composition of the population and the length of the model the researcher is de-
veloping. An individual can be in any one of the stages of infection. Susceptible
(S), the individual is able to contract the infection; exposed (E), the individual has
contracted the disease but is not yet infectious or symptomatic; infectious (I), the
individual is contagious and may or may not be showing symptoms; and removed
(R), an individual can be removed from the population by recovering with immunity,
being quarantined or by death. In addition to those above some models include stage
M, a passive immunity stage reached only by the birth of an infant who temporarily
holds immunity through vertical transmission of the mother’s antibodies. The name
of the model is an acronym of the above letters describing the flow patterns between
cohorts. Some of the most commonly studied models are MSEIR, MSEIRS, SEIR,
SEIRS, SIR, SIRS, SEI, SEIS, SI, and. [Ref. 11: p. 601]
A. THE BASIC EQUATIONS
Kermack’s and McKendrick’s work on the closed population (a population
of finite size, with no new entries) epidemic problem has been the springboard for
much study in the field of epidemiology. In a closed population it was assumed that
individuals became infected at a rate proportional to the number of susceptible and
the number of infected, individuals became removed at a rate proportional to the
number of infected. In a closed population it was not possible to enter the susceptible




I˙ = βSI − γI (II.1)
R˙ = −γI
A stochastic process forms naturally from the deterministic K and K equations
above. The process will be Markovian with a finite number of states (at most N +1).
There are four possible transitions involved in the process during a small time interval
(t, t + dt):
1. an infection (S → S − 1 and I → I + 1) with probability βSIdt+ o(dt);
2. a removal (I → I − 1 and R→ R + 1) with probability γIdt + o(dt);
3. a variety of multiple transitions, with total probability o(dt); and
4. no change, with probability 1− (βS + γ)Idt + o(dt)). [Ref. 12: p. 154]
In both the deterministic and stochastic systems β is the infection rate and
γ is the removal rate. The ratio, ρ = γ
β
, is called the epidemic threshold or relative
removal rate. The size of the epidemic is therefore simply a function the size of the
population and the size of the threshold ratio.[Ref. 13: p. 178]
The previous two systems make a number of assumptions about the popula-
tion. They are:
1. The population is closed, there are never any new susceptible individuals en-
tering the population.
2. The population is homogeneous, there is an even mixing of all members and
every member is equally likely to contract the disease.
3. Every meeting of an infected host with a susceptible individual leads to a new
infection.
4. There are only three possible classifications of members; susceptible, infective
and removed. [Ref. 12: p. 156]
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These assumptions make the systems rather easy to work with, precise solu-
tions can be found to both the deterministic and stochastic systems. The assumptions
however do not model precisely, the interactions of most populations or the behavior
of most diseases. Most populations are arranged in various subgroups and clusters
of subgroups which have varying interaction rates and susceptibilities to infection.
Individuals may also belong to more than one subgroup or mixing group at the same
time. The infective stage of the disease may also be broken down into a number
of smaller stages that will have an effect on the contact rate an individual has with
others. Most diseases have a latent period in which the individual is infected with the
disease but not yet contagious and not yet symptomatic. The disease will also have an
incubation period which is measured from the time of infection until the surfacing of
the first symptoms. The most dangerous time of the infective period is the difference
in time from the end of the latent period to the end of the incubation period. During
this time the individual can transmit the disease to a susceptible individual but has
no symptoms to warn him that he is a danger to others. This time period is well
known to all who study the AIDS epidemic. The average latent period is just about
11 months while the incubation period can be up to twelve times as long. Studies in
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s identified the mean incubation period of AIDS in gay
males to be 11.70 ± .40 years.[Ref. 1] [Ref. 14: pp. 21-33] This dramatic difference
between the end of the latent period and the end of the incubation period have made
controlling the AIDS epidemic a formidable task. A military weapon that captured
this large difference in latent and incubation periods, for example a latent period of
3 days and an incubation period 30 days, would be very effective. As the individual
moves further into the symptomatic portion of the infection his effective contact rate
will drop dramatically. There is, indeed, much more variability in the spread of an
epidemic than the K and K equations will allow.
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B. THE HETEROGENEITY OF EPIDEMICS
Most populations are not a simple well mixed group of homogeneous individ-
uals. A population may be divided up into a series of overlapping subgroups and
clusters of subgroups. The amount of interaction within the group varies from sub-
group to subgroup. The amount of interaction between subgroups again depends on
the type of groups one is considering.
In their 1974 article ”Stochastic Simulation Models for Two Immunization
Problems”, Elveback, Fox and Ackerman develop an influenza model based on the
structure of a small suburban community. They divided their population up into
families (with and without children), age groups(pre-school, grade school, high school,
young adult, older adult), play groups and family clusters. The subgroups were
obviously not distinct as an eight-year-old second-grader would belong to a family
with children, the grade school subgroup, some play group and a family cluster.
For their model they developed a number a variabilities in the parameters of
the epidemic which were meant to be general enough to adapt for all infectious agents
that spread through person-to-person contact. These will be adopted and added to
for this research. The variations include:
1. Variations in relative susceptibility between individuals or subgroups
2. Variations in the length of the latent period.
3. Variations in the length of the incubation period.
4. Variations in the length of the infectivity period.
5. Ability to assign what proportion of infections actually become symptomatic.
6. Variations in the time of withdrawal from the susceptible population following
infection, as a function of subgroup assignment.
They introduce a parameter to describe the contact rate, β, between any two
individuals in the population. This is the rate at which any two individuals make
contact sufficient enough to pass the infection. During each iteration of time the
12
program considers each susceptible individual separately, where his probability of
remaining infection free depends on numerous parameters.






G = the number of the individual’s mixing group
Ig = the number of infective cases in group g
θc = the relative infectiouness of case c
βig = the contact rate for person i in group g
Si = the relative susceptibility of person i
[Ref. 15: pp. 92-95]
C. CURRENT STUDIES
Currently a number of government agencies including the new Office of Home-
land Defense are interested in estimating the effects of Biological Warfare and Bioter-
rorism. John Bombardt of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) authored, ”Con-
tagious Disease Dynamics for Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism Casualty Assess-
ment.” He studied a 1995 Ebola Hemmoragic Fever (EHF) outbreak in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Armed with the data from the EHF outbreak, Bombardt at-
tempts to estimate, as a function of time, the health care and mortuary services
needed to deal with a military attack or terrorist incident using an agent similar to
EHF.
Bombardt uses the Haydon-Woolhouse-Kitching (HWK) SEIR Algorithm, which
was initially used to model the dynamics of foot and mouth disease in cattle herds
in the United Kingdom. The HWM SEIR Algorithm introduces a set of four finite
difference equations.
S[n] = S[n− 1]− P [n− 1]δt, (II.2)
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E[n] = E[n− 1] + (P [n− 1]− P [n− αa − 1])δt, (II.3)
I[n] = I[n− 1] + (P [n− αa − 1]− P [n− ζa − 1])δt, (II.4)
R[n] = R[n− i] + P [n− ζa − 1]δt; and (II.5)
P [n] = ξ[n]S[n]I[n] (II.6)
N0 = S[n] + E[n] + I[n] + R[n] (II.7)
In equations II.3 − II.5 αa represents the sojourn time in the exposed stage
of the disease and ζa represents the sojourn time in the exposed and infectious stages.
The sojourn time is the amount of time an individual spends in a specific stage of the
disease. The function ξ[n] is a time varying disease transmission rate.
The function P [n] describes the interaction between the cohort groups. This
function inserts a non-linearity into the system of equations so that changes in the
initial conditions cannot easily be used to predict the outcome of the epidemic. For
each implementation of the algorithm the researcher would have to determine the
function P [n] from some piece of data. For the EHF outbreak Bombardt used recorded
dates of symptomatic onset and Monte Carlo trials to derive an expression for the
average new infections per unit time. [Ref. 16: pp. 2-7]
Combining the above models and epidemic theory we will now develop a model
to describe the spread of a man made epidemic through the GCE of a Marine Expe-
ditionary Unit.
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III. THE SEIR MODEL
The scenario used in the development of this model is that the MEU is ashore
conducting operations when one or two members of a platoon present to their battal-
ion aid station with symptoms of some disease. The medical professionals then make
the assumption that the member has been exposed to a biological agent. The agent is
diagnosed to be one that is communicable. The commanders now must decide what
steps to take to limit the spread of the disease and to maintain the mission capability
of their unit.
A. POPULATION DYNAMICS OF COMBAT UNITS
The population dynamic of military combat units lead to a unique type of
mixing within the population. The hierarchical structure of the military means that
units do the majority of their mixing with those units directly above or below them-
selves in the command structure. There are service and support elements that mix
with all units but the majority of mixing happens along chain of command lines. It
is this unique population dynamic that this model attempts to imitate.
An assumption about the size of a homogeneous unit has to be established be-
fore implementing the model. A homogeneous unit is one where the unit is considered
well-mixed, there is an equal likelihood that contact will be made between any pair
of members. The size of this unit depends directly on the overall size of the popula-
tion. Military units have a self-similar force structure. Negating headquarters units,
attachments and reinforcements each military unit is comprised of 3 to 4 subordinant
units whose structure is similar to the parent unit. For example the Marine infantry
regiment contains three infantry battalions, which contain four infantry companies,
which each contain three infantry platoons, which each contain three infantry squads,
which contain three infantry fire-teams, which each contain three infantry men (plus
a fire-team leader). For this model we are dealing with the reinforced infantry bat-
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talion, the largest homogeneous unit is assumed to be the platoon. Using this scaling
the regimental model would assume a company to be a homogeneous unit.
B. WHY EXCEL?
The choice to use Microsoft’s Excel program was made because of its wide
availability and use inside the military. Ideally, the program was designed so that
someone familiar with the interactions of the combat unit and a medical professional
could together define the necessary parameters for the model. They can then esti-
mate when an attack occured, which unit/units were affected and then progress the
epidemic to study the possible extent of the spread of the disease. Parameters can
be changed at any time to simulate different protective steps.
C. THE PARAMETERS
The program opens with two initial worksheets, ”Population Characteristics”
and ”Agent Characteristics” (see Figure 2) where the user fills in the necessary ini-
tial information on the population and suspected biological agent. The following
parameters are necessary to run the program:
Unit: Name of unit
Size: Number of members of the unit
ECR: Effective Contact rate, entered as a percentage (0,1)
Virulence: Entered as a percentage (0,1)
Latent Period: The mean latent period entered in integer form.
Incubation Period: The mean incubation period entered in integer form.
The effective contact rate will be the mean percentage of the homogeneous unit
that any one member has sufficient contact with to pass along the disease. Virulence
is defined as the ability of a virus to cause an infection. For the purpose of this model
it will be used to describe the mean percentage of effective contacts that will lead to
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C1 50 0.75 Virulence: 0.75
C2 50 0.75
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Figure 2. Population and Agent Characteristics Worksheets
dormant, the individual is not contagious. The incubation period is the time prior to
which symptoms appear.
”Contact rate” can be changed at anytime during the execution of the model.
All other parameters remain fixed until the process is reset. An assumption has been
made that the onset of diagnosable symptoms occurs in the day following the end
of the incubation period. An individual will therefore be removed from the active
population the day symptoms appear.
D. THE INTERACTION MATRIX
Upon entering the necessary parameters the user then clicks the ”Create Inter-
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HMED 10 10 10
AHQ 9 2 5 2
A1 7
A2 7 3
A3 7 3 3
AW 7 3 3 3
BHQ 9 2 5 2 3
B1 7
B2 7 3
B3 7 3 3
BW 7 3 3 3
CHQ 9 2 5 2 3 3
C1 7
C2 7 3
C3 7 3 3
CW 7 3 3 3
WHQ 9 2 5 2 5 5 5
WMOR 7
WAA 7 3
WHMG 7 3 3
ATY 7 2 5 2 2 2 2 2
CEP 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
TNK 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
SSP 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
RCN 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
LAR 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
AAV 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 3. Population and Agent Characteristics Worksheets
produced. One is called ”Interaction Matrix.” This is a lower triangular matrix with
the platoon names entered on the initial worksheet as the row and column headings.
(see Figure 3) The user must then enter the expected number of contacts between
units to occur in a 24 hour period. This must be an integer entry. If the units are not
expected to have at least one contact per day the user may leave blank or enter zero.
The entries in the interaction matrix can be changed at any time during the process
to simulate controls placed by higher headquarters or periods of varying interactivity
rates.
E. EPIDEMIC PROGRESSION
The Epidemic Progression sheet is the main working sheet for this model.
The sheet has four main areas; unit totals (See Figure 4), action buttons, population
totals (See Figure 5) and a hidden area. The unit totals area keeps the daily count of
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Unit Size S(t) E(t) I(t) R(t) % Available
BNCP 124 62 37 16 9 0.927419355
HCOM 30 24 6 0 0 1
HSER 63 58 5 0 0 1
HMED 67 62 5 0 0 1
AHQ 14 12 2 0 0 1
A1 50 50 0 0 0 1
A2 50 50 0 0 0 1
A3 51 51 0 0 0 1
AW 25 25 0 0 0 1
BHQ 14 11 3 0 0 1
B1 50 50 0 0 0 1
B2 50 50 0 0 0 1
B3 51 51 0 0 0 1
BW 25 25 0 0 0 1
CHQ 14 9 4 1 0 1
C1 50 50 0 0 0 1
C2 50 50 0 0 0 1
C3 51 51 0 0 0 1
CW 25 25 0 0 0 1
WHQ 6 3 3 0 0 1
WMOR 69 69 0 0 0 1
WAA 50 50 0 0 0 1
WHMG 28 28 0 0 0 1
ATY 139 134 5 0 0 1
CEP 36 33 2 1 0 1
TNK 20 19 1 0 0 1
SSP 30 30 0 0 0 1
RCN 30 27 3 0 0 1
LAR 45 39 6 0 0 1
AAV 55 53 2 0 0 1
Figure 4. Epidemic Progression: Unit Totals
how many members of each unit are currently in each of the different disease stages
(Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious and Removed). There are three different action
buttons the user can employ from this page. ”Advance Time” cycles the programs
algorithms and updates daily totals as if 24 hours had passed. ”Reset this page” resets
the current page back to day zero and removes all data. This will allow the user to do
multiple runs with the same initial conditions to compare quantitative results. ”Reset
Entire Program” returns the user back to the initial worksheet. This needs to be done
if the user wants to change any of the disease parameters or change the composition of
his population. At any time while operating the Epidemic Progression sheet the user
can change any of the values on the Interaction Matrix or change any of the effective
19
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Figure 5. Epidemic Progression: Population Totals and Action Buttons
contact rates on the Population Characteristics sheet. The population totals area has
a simple day counter and contains the population totals for the different stages of
the disease. The hidden area holds the daily progression totals for the exposed and
infectious stages of the disease. Let L be the entry in the latent period and C be
the difference between the entry in the incubation period and the entry in the latent
period. The hidden area will contain L+C +2 columns, L+1 of those columns will
be exposure columns and C + 1 will be infectious columns.
F. THE ALGORITHMS
The algorithms that drive this model are broken up into three major sections.
The homogeneous epidemic spread, heterogeneous epidemic spread and total epidemic
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progression.
1. Homogeneous Epidemic Spread
Homogeneous epidemic spread is used to describe the disease dynamics inside
a homogeneous unit. Individuals in the unit move between the four different disease
classes S → E → I → R through a combination of deterministic K and K equa-
tions and a Markov process. The following variables are introduced to describe this
progression.
v = virulence
r = effective contact rate
L = latent period
C = incubation period - latent period
N = size of unit (III.1)
S(t) = number of susceptible at time t
E(t) = total number of exposed at time t
I(t) = total number of infectious at time t
R(t) = number of removed at time t
The exposed stage, E(t), and infectious stage, I(t), is individuals that have
been exposed or infectious for varying numbers of days.
E(t) = E1(t) + E2(t) + · · ·+ EL+1 (III.2)
I(t) = I1(t) + I2(t) + · · ·+ IC+1 (III.3)
The subscripts indicate the number of days individuals have been in the ex-
posed or infectious state. E3(t) is the number of individuals that have been in the
exposed state for 3 days. Movement between the days of the exposed and infectious
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states is a Markov process with the following transition matrix.
E1 E2 · · · EL−2 EL−1 EL EL+1 I1 · · ·
E1 0 1 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·











EL−2 0 0 · · · 0 1 0 0 0 · · ·
EL−1 0 0 · · · 0 0 0.8 0 0.2 · · ·
EL 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 · · ·
EL+1 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 1 · · ·























I1 · · · 0 1 · · · 0 0 0 0 0











IC−2 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1 0 0 0
IC−1 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 0.8 0 0.2
IC · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0.4 0.6
IC+1 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 1
R · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 1
An assumption for this model is that once an individual reaches the end of the incu-
bation period and becomes symptomatic he is removed from the population by the
beginning of the next day. There is no recovery where the individual can be reentered
into the active population to full duty. Now the four equations for the progress of
each state of the epidemic can be defined
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S(t + 1) = S(t)− vrS(t)I(t)
N
(III.4)
E(t + 1) = E(t) +
vrS(t)I(t)
N
− (.2(EL−1(t)) + .6(EL(t)) + EL+1(t)) (III.5)
I(t + 1) = I(t) + (.2(EL−1(t)) + .6(EL(t)) + EL+1(t))
−(.2(IC−1(t)) + .6(IC(t)) + IC+1(t)) (III.6)
R(t + 1) = R(t) + (.2(IC−1(t)) + .6(IC(t)) + IC+1(t)) (III.7)
2. Heterogeneous Epidemic Spread
The heterogeneous spread of the epidemic is based on how the different units
interact with one another. The user will have established this through the interaction
matrix by entering the mean number of expected effective contacts between each
pair of units. These parameters can change at any time in the modeling process.
An assumption for this model is that all members of the units are equally likely to
take part in this interaction. This may not be exactly accurate as officers and staff
noncommissioned officers are much more likely to attend staff meetings and planning
sessions than a lower ranking enlisted Marine. There are, however, working parties
and police details that are chosen at random and these interactions are significant.
The calculation of the amount of spread between units is then quite simple.
For example, assume Unit i and Unit j are expected to have 10 interactions each day.
One member is randomly selected from each unit and they are brought together for
an interaction. The algorithm for determining the number of new exposures for both
units is as follows:
New Exposures for Unit A = 0
New Exposures for Unit B = 0
For i = 1 to 10
Randomly select on member from Unit A = Ai
Randomly select on member from Unit B = Bi
If Ai = S and Bi = I then
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New Exposures for Unit A = New Exposures for Unit A +1
If Ai = I and Bi = S then
New Exposures for Unit B = New Exposures for Unit B +1
All other combinations lead to no change in new exposures.
Next i
All possible unit combinations are checked and a hidden sheet tracks and totals
all of the new exposures from 24 hours worth of interactions. These new exposures
will be added to the new exposures from the homogeneous epidemic spread and begin
the next day as Expnew.
3. Totals
Each time the ”Advance Time” button is activated, the homogeneous spread
and heterogeneous spread calculations occur using the previous days total. After all
calculations are complete and the number of new exposures is totaled the unit totals
are all advanced one day in preparation for the next advancement of time. The totals
presented in the Epidemic Progression page are the totals for the end of the current
day.
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IV. SCENARIO TESTING AND DATA
The scenario tested for this research is a typical mission for the GCE of the
MEU(SOC). The Battalion Landing Team (BLT) has been inserted to secure an air-
field and set-up a defensive posture to allow for the introduction of follow-on forces.
A total of 1362 Marines and sailors are ashore operating in a defensive operations.
Typical attachments and reinforcements have been made, local resistance is mini-
mal but the situation is still very unstable. There has been intelligence that some
biological weapons work has been ongoing in the country but no definite threat.
Although the BLT is self sufficient for up to 15 days there is often contact
with the local population for interpreters, garbage removal and some transportation.
At some time, t = 0, a biological agent is released, covertly, and one unit becomes
exposed. The BLT then continues on with its daily activities until the epidemic
becomes evident.
A. UNHINDERED EPIDEMIC SPREAD
The first step in testing the model was to allow the epidemic to progress
unhindered for 10 days. The only action taken against the epidemic was to remove
the actively symptomatic individuals from the circulating population. Various initial
conditions (see Table 1) were tested to develop a baseline database. The conditions
tested included, initial unit exposed, level of that exposure, virulence, latent period
and incubation period. Each possible combination of conditions was tested five times
for a ten day period. Over 18,600 daily iterations were recorded in developing the
database.
Upon completing the 18,600 iterations of the epidemic progression program,
data analysis was performed on the entire set of data and selected scenarios. The
mean ten day exposure level was 23.90% with a standard deviation of .131. This
means that, throughout all different possible combinations of initial conditions, the
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Various Initial Conditions Used in Testing Epidemic Model
Virulence Latent and Unit Initially Level of
Incubation Period Exposed Initial Exposure
.25 2/4 Battalion Command Post
2/5 (BNCP) 25%
.33 2/6
2/7 Rear Command Post
.50 2/8 (BNRR)
2/9 50%
.67 2/10 Alpha Company
3/5 (ACO)
.75 3/6





Table 1. Initial Conditions
average percentage of the total population that became exposed to the epidemic,
after ten days of unhindered spread, was 23.90%. The distribution of these ten day
exposure percentages can be seen in Fig 6.
After analyzing the entire data set, specific scenarios were extracted to allow
examination of the progress of the epidemic when specific conditions were allowed to
vary. The scenarios allowed the initial conditions to be held constant while one was
allowed to vary.
1. Variations in Incubation Periods
For the first scenario the latent period was fixed at two days and the viru-
lence was fixed at 67%. The initial unit exposed and exposure level were also fixed
although two different units and exposure levels were investigated. For the battalion
command post, exposed at 50%, and Alpha company exposed at 25%, we examined
the incubation periods of 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The results are found in Table 2.
The trend is obvious at first glance, as the incubation period increases so does
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Ten Day Exposure Percentages
Figure 6. Histogram of Ten Day Exposure Percentages
2/10 there was actually a small drop). The rate of change is very steep in the begin-
ning and then levels off as the incubation period increases. For the battalion command
post as the incubation period went from 4 to 6 (from two times the latent period to
three times the latent period), there was a 104% increase in total exposures. For the
same unit, as the incubation period went from 6 to 8, there was only a 10% increase
in the total number of exposures. The results were similar for an initial exposure of
Alpha company at 25%. As the incubation period went from 4 to 6, there was a 110%
increase in total exposures; from 6 to 8, there was a 13% increase in total exposures.
The goal of any weapon is to create the largest amount of casualties in the
shortest amount of time. To that end a biological weapons designer would want a
disease to spread quickly, but also become incapacitating in the shortest amount of
time. In this data we have seen that by moving from an incubation period of 4 days
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Latent and BNCP @ 50% ACO @ 25%








Table 2. Ten Day Exposure Percentages for Variations in Incubation Periods with
Fixed Latent Period (3), Incubation Period(9) and Fixed Virulence (.67)
to one of 6 days we were able to double the effect of the weapon where as going from
4 days to 8 days gave only little additional effect.
2. Variations in Virulence
For the next scenario latent/incubation periods were fixed at 2/8, the unit and
initial exposure level were fixed as the rear command post exposed at 25%. The total
ten day exposure percentage was then examined for virulence .25, .33, .50, .67 and
.75. The results can be found in Table 3.
Increasing virulence had interesting results. The first increases in virulence
did not produce the largest increases in total exposures. Rather the middle increase
from .33 to .50 produce the largest increase, an 81% increase in total exposures.
The increases progressed as follows: Virulence .25 to .33, 44% increase in exposures;
virulence .33 to .50, 81% increase in exposures; virulence .50 to .67, 41% increase in
exposures; virulence .67 to .75, 8% increase in exposures. It appears as if the overall
size of the epidemic is proportional to v(1− v).
One developing weapons then might strive for the .50 virulence and not put the
effort into higher virulence at the expense of other aspects of the weapon. The time,
effort and money need to increase virulence might be channeled into more effective
delivery systems to increase the dissemination of a weaker agent over a larger percent
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Table 3. Ten Day Exposure Percentages for Variations in Virulence with Fixed Latent
Period (3), Incubation Period(9) and fixed Unit (BNRR @25%)
3. Variations in Units and Exposure Levels
The impact of which unit is initially infected and at what level that unit is
infected goes far beyond the total number of exposures. Exposing one of the rifle
companies will most likely take away one fourth of the combat units available to the
commander. Exposing the battalion command post will disrupt command and control
and take away many of the unit’s leaders. As medical, maintenance, communication,
ammunition and armory support all lie inside the rear command post, an exposure
here will disrupt nearly all service and support.
The results found in Table 4 reveal consistent changes in the overall number
of exposed, as unit and exposure levels change. Doubling the initial level of exposure
resulted in a mean growth of 51% in total exposures. In essence, doubling the dissem-
ination capabilities increased the overall number of exposed 11
2
times. There were no
significant surprises in the differences of exposure based on which unit was initially
exposed. The rear command post, which contains the bulk of the service and support
units, facilitated the fastest spread of the epidemic. Weapons company which is the
smallest unit and often operates independently of the other rifle companies facilitated
the slowest spread of disease.
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Level of Ten Day %











Table 4. Ten Day Exposure Percentages for Variations in Units and Exposure Levels,
with Fixed Latent Period (3), Incubation Period (9) and Fixed Virulence (.67)
B. COUNTERMEASURES
The previous section allowed the epidemic to spread unhindered for ten days.
In this section four defensive techniques or countermeasures will be implemented to see
if any impact can be made on the overall size of the epidemic. Countermeasures will
include quarantine, elevation of the protective posture of troops, a limited quarantine
strategy and a combination of two of these. The ”Variations in Virulence” section will
be the scenario used in testing the countermeasures. Latent and incubation periods
have been fixed at 2 and 8 respectively and the rear command post will be exposed
at 25%.
1. Countermeasure 1
A unit wide quarantine will be imposed on any unit that has members display-
ing active, diagnosable symptoms of disease. This will be done by setting all entries
for this unit in the interaction matrix to zero and reducing the effective contact rate
within this unit to zero. This knee-jerk reaction may effect the spread of the disease,
but it will also have drastic effects on the ability of the BLT to conduct its mission.
Completely quarantining the battalion command post will allow for command and
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control only across the radio. Completely quarantining the service and support units
will cause all resupply, meal and medical service to cease. This countermeasure will
only be able to be done on a limited scope and for a short period of time. For this
model a quarantine was imposed on a unit as soon as the first member of the unit
reached the symptomatic stage (R(t)).
For this scenario the first symptomatic individuals appeared on day 6 or 7.
Applying the quarantine as units presented as symptomatic effectively cut the total
number of individuals exposed to the disease by more than 32% (See Table 5). As
these tests ran for just ten days the quarantine was short in duration but the problem
was most definitely not solved. The quarantine strategy may be a good first measure
as the BLT tries to identify the extent of the spread of the disease. This posture
would not be viable for an extended period of time.
Another problem with this is that on average 19 platoons and 9 percent of
the total population have at least been exposed to the disease by the time the first
exposures become symptomatic. While one unit was being quarantined 18 others
were still capable of spreading the disease throughout the BLT.
Unhindered Countermeasure 1 Reduction in
Virulence Exposure % Exposure % Total Exposed
.25 12.45% 7.18% 42.33%
.33 17.93% 12.00% 33.07%
.50 32.57% 21.21% 34.88%
.67 46.02% 31.32% 31.82%
.75 49.85% 39.44% 20.88%
Average Reduction in Total Exposed 32.60%
Table 5. Results from Countermeasure 1
2. Countermeasure 2
Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is the countermeasure with which
combat troops are most familiar. From very early on in introductory training, troops
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are taught that the first response to a nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attack
is to don their protective gear. For this scenario the entire BLT will be placed at
MOPP-4, the highest protective posture afforded to combat troops, when it becomes
apparent there has been a biological attack (R(t) ≥ 1). This level of protection
consists of wearing the entire protective suit to include rubber boots, gloves and
the protective gas mask. The reality is that operating at MOPP-4 is difficult and
taxing on troops. Basic functions such as drinking water, eating, using the latrine
and using weapons becomes decidedly more difficult while at MOPP-4. The current
threat from a biological weapon that has started an epidemic in the BLT might be
able to be treated differently. The protective suit troops carry into combat protects
against chemical agents and biological that have the ability to enter the body through
unbroken skin. The biological agents that spread through person to person contact
rely on spreading through respiratory droplets and other body fluids. The protective
posture may be able to be relaxed and adapted to limit the disease’s ability to spread
while still allowing the troops to complete their mission (see Table 6).
Unhindered Countermeasure 2 Reduction in
Virulence Exposure % Exposure % Total Exposed
.25 12.45% 6.89% 44.66%
.33 17.93% 9.24% 48.47%
.50 32.57% 18.37% 43.60%
.67 46.02% 23.69% 48.52%
.75 49.85% 27.52% 44.79%
Average Reduction in Total Exposed 46.01%
Table 6. Results from Countermeasure 2
With an average reduction of over 46% , placing the unit into MOPP-4 proved
to significantly reduce the spread of the disease. This reduction was reached without
having to stop the interactions between units. Command and control can still take
place face-to-face, resupply and rearming will be able to keep the units mission ca-
pable. The covert attack we are modeling here still allows for a significant spread of
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the disease. Both of the previous countermeasures allow for action to be taken only
after the symptoms of the disease become evident.
3. Countermeasure 3
If the intelligence community received information of an increased threat of
attack by biological weapons, there may be time to implement a limited vaccination
campaign. There are entire studies that investigate the most effective vaccination
strategies. For the purpose of this study we simulate vaccinating a unit by reducing
their effective contact rates by 85%. This would rely on knowing what the suspected
agent would be, having the vaccines on hand and having time to let the vaccines
become effective. We will assume for this case the all have been met and there are a
limited number of vaccinations available. The decision has been made to vaccinate all
of the service and support personnel as they are the most likely to spread the disease.
Results for this countermeasure can be found in Table 7
Unhindered Countermeasure 3 Reduction in
Virulence Exposure % Exposure % Total Exposed
.25 12.45% 10.65% 14.46%
.33 17.93% 14.93% 16.73%
.50 32.57% 27.00% 17.10%
.67 46.02% 42.45% 7.76%
.75 49.85% 48.31% 3.01%
Average Reduction in Total Exposed 11.81%
Table 7. Results from Countermeasure 3
Although this strategy did reduce the total size of the epidemic by an average
of more than 10%, the results were far less encouraging than the previous two coun-
termeasures. The results are not completely unexpected though. Only 12% of the
total population received the vaccination, this resulted in a decrease of nearly 12% in
the size of the epidemic. Each of these countermeasures by itself has serious shortfalls
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in either protection or the ability of the BLT to conduct its mission. A combination
of countermeasures may provide a better solution.
4. Countermeasure 4
This countermeasure combined a limited vaccination strategy with an increase
in protective posture after the first symptoms appeared. This essentially combined
countermeasures 2 and 3. As expected, combining two countermeasures increased the
overall protection afforded to the BLT, consequently the epidemic was contained even
further.
Realistically our forces need to have numerous options for protection against
biological weapons. Both prophylactic and active protection can combine to give
better protection than any one measure by itself. For this combination, the spread
of the epidemic was cut, on average, by more than half. The 51.72% (see Table 8)
decrease in overall size of the epidemic equates to 473 (34% of the population) fewer
exposures in the worst case seen in this study.
Unhindered Countermeasure 4 Reduction in
Virulence Exposure % Exposure % Total Exposed
.25 12.45% 6.24% 49.88%
.33 17.93% 7.99% 55.44%
.50 32.57% 14.14% 56.59%
.67 46.02% 23.61% 48.70%
.75 49.85% 25.93% 47.98%
Average Reduction in Total Exposed 51.72%
Table 8. Results from Countermeasure 4
C. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COUNTER-
MEASURES AND UNHINDERED SPREAD
To ensure that the difference found in applying the different countermeasures
was not a simple statistical anomaly, Student’s t-tests for paired means were applied
to the data. With a null hypothesis that there was no difference between the two,
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the one-tailed tests yielded probabilities much less than 1%. This essentially ensures
that the countermeasures are having an effect on the size of the epidemic. The Excel
produced analysis for countermeasures 1-3 can be seen in Fig. 7
T-Test analysis for Countermeasures versus Unhindered Spread
L/I = 2/8 Vir .25
Counter Unhindered t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Measure1 Spread
8.66% 11.38% Variable 1 Variable 2
5.80% 12.11% Mean 0.071806167 0.124375918
8.22% 11.60% Variance 0.000206841 0.000120914
7.71% 13.07% Observations 5 5
5.51% 14.02% Pearson Correlation -0.68225238




t Critical one-tail 2.131846486
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00727182
t Critical two-tail 2.776450856
L/I = 2/8 Vir 67
Counter Unhindered t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Measure2 Spread
24.23% 44.13% Variable 1 Variable 2
26.21% 50.44% Mean 0.233333333 0.46020558
21.00% 46.55% Variance 0.000396055 0.000711412
22.25% 44.05% Observations 5 5
22.98% 44.93% Pearson Correlation 0.579836365




t Critical one-tail 2.131846486
P(T<=t) two-tail 2.16436E-05
t Critical two-tail 2.776450856
L/I = 2/8 Vir .50
Counter Unhindered t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Measure3 Spread
25.84% 30.76% Variable 1 Variable 2
26.80% 33.70% Mean 0.270044053 0.325697504
25.40% 33.55% Variance 0.000351312 0.000441391
30.18% 34.88% Observations 5 5
26.80% 29.96% Pearson Correlation 0.516641297




t Critical one-tail 2.131846486
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.003177617
t Critical two-tail 2.776450856
Figure 7. t-test analysis of differences between countermeasures and unhindered
spread
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The threat of biological weapons is a very real threat to our military forces.
While everyone is concerned about the possible consequences of a biological agent
being released, the operating force in general is not prepared to deal with an outbreak
of a contagious and deadly or disabling disease. The goal of this thesis was not only
to develop a model to describe the spread of disease in a functioning military unit
but also to develop a tool that might be useful to military planners at the tactical
level.
If a military unit was covertly exposed to a biological weapon with the right
combination of virulence, latent and incubation periods, initial target and exposure
levels the unit can quickly become overwhelmed by the disease. In fifteen different
trials over 60% (820 men) of the BLT became exposed to the disease after just 10
days. These numbers would completely overwhelm the medical services of the BLT
and supporting Naval forces, the BLT would be essentially combat ineffective and the
psychological impact on the Nation would be extreme.
Some basic countermeasures can be taken to reduce the spread of the disease.
As examples quarantine, protective postures, incubation and combinations of these
were tested to validate the model created. Each had a positive impact on the overall
size of the epidemic.
The problem of modeling the impact of biological weapons is one that needs to
be addressed by a much wider community. There are current studies and programs
ongoing to do just this. The Joint Operational Effects Federation (JOEF) in its
mission statement spells out the task at hand.
The requirement exists for a modeling and simulation (M&S) analytical
capability to determine and assess the impact of nuclear, biological chemical
and radiological warfare (NBCRW) on military operations. This requirement
for an accredited, predictive, M&S capability supports both a near term re-
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quirement for advance planning and analysis role supporting wartime opera-
tions and the far term requirement for near real-time decision making capa-
bilities (i.e. combat).[Ref. 17]
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The task of developing a realistic model will be a daunting but neccessary task.
The issue will be getting the right combination of individuals working on the project.
At a minimum representatives from the medical, operations analysis, tactical planning
and mathematics communities need to come together to work on this project.
The model needs to be easy enough for tactical forces to apply in a field envi-
ronment but also complete enough to produce quality information to the commander
and his planning staff. The model developed in this research was Microsoft Excel
based, all efforts should be made to keep the programs involved simple. Tactical
forces do not need to learn an entirely new system for running these models.
This model defined a largest homogeneous unit (the platoon), there is no
reason this model could not be expanded to be able to work with individual members
of the unit. Experiments would need to be run to determine the exact interaction
behavior down to the individual. The model could then combine that information
along with the Table of Organization for the unit. The Table of Organization is a list
of all of the individual billets with in a unit. A program could retrieve both pieces of
information and describe the spread of disease with much greater accuracy.
The modeling tool developed for this research was created in a relatively short
period of time. Given ample time and the right combination of contributors, a simple
yet effective planning tool could be developed to be used by tactical units. More time
could then be devoted to developing the type of system the JOEF plans on fielding
by 2008.
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’ Macro recorded 1/22/2002 by rwpaters
’
’ This Macro takes the initial population and infective agent
’ information and creates all other sheets needed to run the
’ model. The Interaction Matrix Sheet is a lower triangular
’ matrix where the user will enter the number of daily interactions
’ between two units. The Temp Sheet tracks and totals the number
’ of daily new exposures as a result of the cross-unit contamination.
’ This sheet will be hidden from view unless the user decides to
’ view it. The Epidemic Progression Sheet tracks the spread of the
’ disease. Daily numbers of susceptible, exposed, infectious and
’ removed from each unit along with population totals and day of
’ exposure is tracked.
’
’Creates Interaction Matrix Sheet
Sheets.Add
ActiveSheet.Name = "Interaction Matrix"
For i = 2 To 251
If Sheets("Population Characteristics").Cells(i, 2) <> "" Then
Sheets("Interaction Matrix").Cells(i, 1) = Sheets("Population_
Characteristics").Cells(i, 2)
















For i = 2 To 251
For J = i To 251









If Cells(i, 1) <> "" Then
For J = 2 To i




’Creates Epidemic Progression Sheet
Sheets.Add
ActiveSheet.Name = "Epidemic Progression"
For i = 2 To 251
If Sheets("Population Characteristics").Cells(i, 2) <> "" Then
Sheets("Epidemic Progression").Cells(i, 1) = Sheets("Population_
Characteristics").Cells(i, 2)
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For J = 2 To 251
If Cells(J, 2) <> "" Then
Cells(J, 7).FormulaR1C1 = "=1 - RC[-1]/RC[-5]"
Cells(J, 3).FormulaR1C1 = "=RC[-1]-RC[1]-RC[2]-RC[3]"
End If
Next J
L = Sheets("Agent Characteristics").Cells(6, 2)
C = Sheets("Agent Characteristics").Cells(7, 2) - Sheets("Agent_
Characteristics").Cells(6, 2)
For i = 1 To L + 1
Cells(1, 14 + i) = "E" & i
Next i
For i = 1 To C + 1
Cells(1, 14 + L + 1 + i) = "I" & i
Next i
’ Columns("O:IV").Select
’ Selection.EntireColumn.Hidden = True
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’ Creates Temp Sheet
Sheets.Add
ActiveSheet.Name = "Temp"
For i = 2 To 251
If Sheets("Population Characteristics").Cells(i, 2) <> "" Then
Sheets("Temp").Cells(i, 1) = Sheets("Population_
Characteristics").Cells(i, 2)
















For i = 2 To 7
For J = 1 To 2












Cells(4, 10) = "Day"
Cells(4, 11) = "1"
Cells(5, 10) = "Population Totals"
Cells(4, 13) = "N ="
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Cells(9, 11) = "#Units Exp"
For i = 10 To 13
Cells(6, i) = Cells(1, i - 7)
Next i

















Selection.ShapeRange.ScaleWidth 1.58, msoFalse, msoScaleFromTopLeft
Selection.ShapeRange.ScaleHeight 0.26, msoFalse, msoScaleFromTopLeft


















Selection.ShapeRange.ScaleWidth 1.58, msoFalse, msoScaleFromTopLeft
Selection.ShapeRange.ScaleHeight 0.26, msoFalse, msoScaleFromTopLeft

















Selection.ShapeRange.ScaleWidth 1.58, msoFalse, msoScaleFromTopLeft
Selection.ShapeRange.ScaleHeight 0.26, msoFalse, msoScaleFromTopLeft

















Selection.ShapeRange.ScaleWidth 1.58, msoFalse, msoScaleFromTopLeft
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’ Macro recorded 1/22/2002 by rwpaters
’ This macro advances the daily progression of the epidemic in three
’ phases. First the previous day’s data is shifted and new exposures
’ from the homogeneous (intraunit) spread is computed. Next heterogeneuos
’ (interunit) spread is computed and last they are combined and recorded
’ as the current days entries.
Worksheets("Epidemic Progression").Activate
L = Sheets("Agent Characteristics").Cells(6, 2)
C = Sheets("Agent Characteristics").Cells(7, 2) - Sheets("Agent_
Characteristics").Cells(6, 2)
’_______________________________________________________________________
’Sets intial exposure or infection into action
If Cells(4, 11) = 1 Then
For i = 2 To 251
If Cells(i, 2) <> "" Then
Cells(i, 16 + L) = Cells(i, 5)
Cells(i, 15) = Cells(i, 4)
End If
If Cells(i, 4) <> "" Then
b = i
For J = 2 To 251







Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 1) = Cells(b, 1)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 2) = "Initial Exposure"
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 3) = Sheets("Agent Characteristics")_
.Cells(6, 2) ’latent
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 4) = Sheets("Agent Characteristics")_
.Cells(7, 2) ’incubation
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 5) = Sheets("Agent Characteristics")_
.Cells(4, 2) ’virulence
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 6) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(4, 11) ’day
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 7) = Cells(b, 4) ’S(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 8) = "0" ’E(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 9) = "0" ’I(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 10) = "0" ’R(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 11) = "1" ’#Units Exposed
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 12) = "0" ’#Units Infected
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 13) = Cells(b, 4) / Cells(5, 13)
End If
’______________________________________________________________________________
For J = 2 To 251
If Cells(J, 2) <> "" Then
t1 = Cells(J, 15) ’
Remd = Cells(J, 16 + L + C) ’
For i = 15 To 15 + L + C ’This area shifts day(t) information
t2 = Cells(J, i + 1) ’to prepare for next set of
Cells(J, i + 1) = t1 ’calculations
t1 = t2 ’
Next i ’
Cells(J, 17 + L + C) = Null ’
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’_________________________________________________________________________________
’ Intraunit Spread Computation
’ New Exposures ~ S(t)*I(t)
ecr = Norm(Sheets("Population Characteristics")_
.Cells(J, 4), 0.1)
If ecr > 0 Then
ExpN = Round((Cells(J, 3) * Cells(J, 5) * ecr * _




’Once an individual enters the exposed stage the transition through the
’ exposed, infectious and removed stage is an absorbing Markov process.
’ Selects which individuals transition and when that transition occurs.
’ Basic transition probatilities are that E_1 >> E_2 wp 1;
’E_i >> E_i+1 wp 1; E_L-2 >> E_L-1 wp 1; E_L-1 >> E_L wp .8,
’ E_L-1 >> I_1 wp .2; E_L >> E_L+1 wp .4, E_L >> I_1 wp .6;
’ E_L+1 >> I_1 wp 1; I_1 >> I_2 wp 1;I_i >> I_i+1 wp 1;
’ I_L-2 >> I_L-1 wp 1; I_L-1 >> I_L wp .8, I_L-1 >> R wp .2;
’ I_L >> I_L+1 wp .4, I_L >> R wp .6; I_L+1 >> R wp 1;
’New Infections (those transitioning to I_1)
e1 = 0 ’
For i = 1 To Cells(J, 15 + L) ’
a = Rnd() ’
If a <= 0.6 Then ’




For i = 1 To Cells(J, 14 + L)
a = Rnd()
If a <= 0.2 Then




Cells(J, 16 + L) = Cells(J, 16 + L) + e1 + e2
’Exposure adjustments
Cells(J, 15 + L) = Cells(J, 15 + L) - e1
Cells(J, 14 + L) = Cells(J, 14 + L) - e2
’New Removals (those transitioning to R)
r1 = 0
For i = 1 To Cells(J, 15 + L + C)
a = Rnd()
If a <= 0.6 Then




For i = 1 To Cells(J, 14 + L + C)
a = Rnd()
If a <= 0.2 Then
r2 = r2 + 1
End If
Next i
RemT = Remd + r1 + r2
’Infections adjustment
Cells(J, 15 + L + C) = Cells(J, 15 + L + C) - r1
Cells(J, 14 + L + C) = Cells(J, 14 + L + C) - r2
’______________________________________________________________________________
’ The Heterogenous or interunit spread of the disease uses the user supplied
’ interaction matrix to determine how many effective contacts become new
’ exposures. This area randomly selects pairs of individuals from the two
’ concerned units and with probatility = virulence, when an
’ infectious individual contacts a susceptible, a new exposure is created.
’ Interunit Spread Computation
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For i = J + 1 To 251
If Sheets("Interaction Matrix").Cells(i, J) <> "" Then
te = 0
be = 0
For h = 1 To Sheets("Interaction Matrix").Cells(i, J)
t = 1 + Int(Cells(J, 2) * Rnd)
b = 1 + Int(Cells(i, 2) * Rnd)
If t <= Cells(J, 5) And b > Cells(i, 5) Then
be = be + 1
End If
If b <= Cells(i, 5) And t > Cells(J, 5) Then
te = te + 1
End If
Next h
Sheets("Temp").Cells(i, J) = te




For k = 2 To 251
ExpH = ExpH + Sheets("Temp").Cells(k, J)
Next k
ExpH = Round(ExpH * Norm(Cells(22, 10), 0.1))
’________________________________________________________________________
’Now the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous spread figures are combined
’to give the new end of day totals. These are then used for the next
’days computations.
’ New Exposures Computation
If Cells(J, 3) >= ExpH + ExpN Then
Cells(J, 15) = ExpH + ExpN
End If
If Cells(J, 3) < ExpH + ExpN Then
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Cells(J, 15) = Cells(J, 3)
End If
ExpT = 0
For i = 15 To 15 + L
ExpT = ExpT + Cells(J, i)
Next i
Cells(J, 4) = (ExpT)
Inft = 0
For i = 16 + L To 16 + L + C
Inft = Inft + Cells(J, i)
Next i
Cells(J, 5) = (Inft)











For i = 2 To 251
If Cells(i, 2) <> "" Then
ST = ST + Cells(i, 3)
ET = ET + Cells(i, 4)
IT = IT + Cells(i, 5)
RT = RT + Cells(i, 6)
If Cells(i, 4) <> "0" Then
UE = UE + 1
End If
If Cells(i, 5) <> "0" Then





Cells(7, 10) = ST
Cells(7, 11) = ET
Cells(7, 12) = IT
Cells(7, 13) = RT
Cells(5, 13) = ST + ET + IT + RT
Cells(10, 11) = UE
Cells(10, 13) = UI
Cells(4, 11) = Cells(4, 11) + 1
For i = 2 To 250




Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 2) = "None"
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 3) = Sheets("Agent Characteristics")_
.Cells(6, 2) ’latent
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 4) = Sheets("Agent Characteristics")_
.Cells(7, 2) ’incubation
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 5) = Sheets("Agent Characteristics")_
.Cells(4, 2) ’virulence
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 6) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(4, 11) ’day
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 7) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(7, 10) ’S(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 8) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(7, 11) ’E(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 9) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(7, 12) ’E(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 10) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(7, 13) ’R(t)
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 11) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(10, 11) ’#Units Exposed
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 12) = Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(10, 13) ’#Units Exposed
Sheets("Data runs").Cells(a + 1, 13) = (Sheets("Epidemic Progression")_
.Cells(7, 11) + Sheets("Epidemic Progression").Cells(7, 12))_
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/ Sheets("Epidemic Progression").Cells(5, 13)
End Sub
’**----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Function Norm(mean As Double, sd As Double) As Double
’Returns one normal random variable from N(mean,sd) distn
’Utilizes polar method as described in Simulation Modeling
’and Analysis (Law & Kelton) page 491.
Dim w As Double, u1 As Double, u2 As Double, v1 As Double
Dim v2 As Double, x1 As Double, x2 As Double
w = 2
While w > 1
u1 = Rnd()
u2 = Rnd()
v1 = 2 * u1 - 1
v2 = 2 * u2 - 1
w = v1 * v1 + v2 * v2
Wend
x1 = sd * v1 * Sqr(-2 * Log(w) / w) + mean
x2 = sd * v2 * Sqr(-2 * Log(w) / w) + mean









’ Macro recorded 2/7/2002 by rwpaters






For i = 2 To 251
If Cells(i, 1) <> "" Then
For J = 2 To i






For i = 2 To 250




Cells(a + 1, 2) = "RESET ALL"
For J = 1 To 13












’ Macro recorded 1/10/2002 by rwpaters
’ Resets the Epidemic Progress sheet back to day = 0
’
L = Sheets("Agent Characteristics").Cells(6, 2)
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C = Sheets("Agent Characteristics").Cells(7, 2) - Sheets("Agent_
Characteristics").Cells(6, 2)
For i = 2 To 251
If Cells(i, 2) <> "" Then
For J = 4 To 6
Cells(i, J) = Null
Next J
For J = 15 To 16 + L + C




For i = 10 To 13
Cells(7, i) = Null
Next i
Cells(4, 11) = "1"
Cells(10, 11) = Null
For i = 2 To 250
Sheets("Data runs").Activate




Cells(a + 1, 2) = "RESET"
For J = 1 To 13













’ Macro recorded 2/18/2002 by rwpaters
’
’ Keyboard Shortcut: Ctrl+r
’
Sheets("Data runs").Activate
For i = 2 To 250
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